Musings on Physics and Teleology

The following question has been bothering me for some time now: Why is the universe composed in such a way that it is at all comprehensible? How have we been so lucky as to exist in a place which is governed by regular physical laws, rather than absolute chaos? As Plantinga, I think, argued, it seems ridiculously improbable that the universe would be one of such perfect order. That the world is in fact ordered seems, therefore, to imply that somebody ordered it. And so we have a form of the teleological argument.

The best response to this argument (or at least the most memorable for me) was that there are many planes of existence, somewhere around three quarters of a jillion, and so the chances of there being one which conformed to strict physical laws becomes much more likely. We, as living beings, of course inhabit one of the ones capable of supporting life. But I don't like this talk of multiple universes. It's almost a contradiction in terms; "universe" is supposed to encompass everything.

So here's another idea, which just came to me while I was reading something about evolution. It's also sort of an argument from probability, but a little different. This is more-or-less stream-of-consciousness, so it may not be the most coherent thing you've ever read. But this is a blog, so I don't feel too bad about that. Anyway, I'll begin with a question: What would the universe be like if it did not observe strict laws? In a word, unpredictable. Change would be the only constant. I'm assuming we've still got space and time, or at least some dimensional framework where change is possible, because otherwise I'm not sure we can meaningfully talk about laws, or even a universe. Things would pop in and out of existence, if that's possible, and everything would fly around in random directions, combining and separating randomly. That would mean that, over time, you'd get a lot of different configurations of things with lots of different properties.

Now, some of these properties would encourage stability: I'm just going to generalize them into one property, p. A thing with p would continue to exist longer than an otherwise identical thing without p. So, by definition, while things without p would disappear quickly, things with p would stick around. Over a period of time, then, the universe would contain more and more things with p. Eventually, everything in the universe would be a thing with p. It would take a really, really long time, of course, but it would happen.

So now we have a universe populated with only things that have p. It seems to me that laws of physics are just properties that everything in the universe has, like "being such that it does not spontaneously accelerate nor decelerate (Newton's First Law)." That would certainly seem to encourage stability. The universe is therefore uniformly governed by certain laws, giving an appearance of design where there was none.

I think that pretty much gets my idea across. What do you think?

Does Russell's Teapot Hold Water? (and more)

So apparently there's this professor, Bill Valencia, who now spends all of his time writing in Nihil philosophicum a me alienum puto, his personal blog. I came across his blog from a Google search for arguments for and against "Russell's Teapot." Valencia authors a fairly exhaustive response here.

Not only does Valencia's blog put all other philosophy blogs I've seen to shame, it's filled with many useful links, including The Athenaeum Library of Philosophy, where you can find pretty much every historical philosophical text ever (never buy a book for a history of philosophy class again!).

Also, if you're courting your more social side, you may try PhiloKings, although from what I've seen it's filled with amateurs. You get two ends of the philosophical spectrum in one post!

Early Morning Ethics

I've become a bit of an insomniac, so instead of sleeping I'm thinking about ethics. More specifically, about dietary ethics. Even more specifically, about my own "free-rangism" and its philosophical underpinnings. I've eaten nothing but free range meat, and no pork, since last March, and while I had a very clear understanding of my reasons for it then, the argument's gotten a little fuzzy. So I thought I'd try to construct it semiformally and post it. I'd also like to hear your thoughts on it, of course. Feel free to mock and sneer and throw jabs at Singer if you like.
The argument runs something like this:
1. It is prima facie immoral (or wrong or unethical or something, the point is it's bad) to inflict intense and extended suffering on any animal.
2. Consuming meat produced by "meat factories" and certain other forms of inudstrialized agriculture causes animals to suffer intensely and for extended periods of time.
3. Therefore, it is prima facie immoral to comsume meat produced by "meat factories" and certain other forms of industrialized agriculture.
4. One derives only nutritional, economic and aesthetic benefits from one's food choices.
5. In most cases, one could live healthily and cheaply by consuming other foods instead of said meat.
6. By (4) and (5), in most cases, the only benefit one receives from said meat and not other foods is an aesthetic benefit.
7. An aesthetic benefit is not a sufficient reason to override the prima facie immorality of an action.
8. Therefore, in most cases it is immoral to consume meat produced by "meat factories" and certain other forms of industrialized agriculture.

I realize that this is a pretty ugly argument, but it is almost 2:30 AM and I am not as coherent as I usually am. Before I post this, I'd like to point a few things out about the argument. First, it does not assume that animals other than humans have a right to life, even a prima facie one (I don't think they have one). It only assumes that they have a prima facie right to not suffer. It also asserts only that aesthetic benefits cannot outweigh this right, but it leaves the possibility of anything else being able to do so. For instance, perhaps it is ethical to torture animals in order to prevent some small amount of human suffering. I am fairly certain, however, that it is not ethical to torture an animal so that I can enjoy a tasty burger.
Please, destroy this argument. Tear it to shreds. I'll be happy, even eager, to see the error of my ways.

Backup room!

News from the Scheduling Office:

Philosophy is confirmed for JBLAIR 215 on Monday 09/01-12/01/08 at 1801-1859. Please use your confirmation number, C6852, when requesting a change to, or cancellation of, this event titled F08 PHILOSOPHY CLUB WKLY.

Just to clarify, we'll still be meeting in the Daily Grind whenever possible, but in case there are too many coffee addicts there one day we can always use this one.

The Case for Skepticism about the External World

The Case for Skepticism about the External World

Long Vinh

5.3.08

Philosophical Problems

Professor Corina Vaida

~*~

It has come to my attention that philosophers have largely ignored skepticism in their pursuit of philosophical truth. To me, this is analogous to walking out onto a pier while ignoring the obvious deterioration of its structural supports. As a result of the dogmatic dismissal of skepticism, all of philosophy must be built upon the weak foundation of the conditional, “If skepticism is false, then X,” with X being the debated dogma of the moment. With this paper, I aim to bring the elephant of skepticism back into the light of discourse by presenting the case for skepticism about the external world. If we can find reason to doubt such intuitively certain beliefs as those regarding the external world, then clearly the rest of our beliefs will come under deeper scrutiny! Towards the goal of revitalizing skepticism in this realm, I will evaluate the three main theories of perception, the means by which we gain knowledge of the external world. Direct realism, indirect representationalism, and phenomenalism, I allege, all suffer from flaws that render their acceptability suspect. After considering a fallibilist response to skepticism, I will suggest several practical implications for these skeptical conclusions. I assert that due to deficiencies in the accounts of our access to the external world, the appropriate response to whether we have knowledge of the external world is skepticism, or the position that we do not know.

I. Direct Realism

As it is the most intuitively plausible account, we begin our discussion with Thomas Reid’s arguments for direct realism, which posits that the immediate object of our perception is a physical object that exists independently of our awareness of it. The direct realist affirms the existence of material bodies that retain properties that resemble our perceptions of them, even when are not perceived. Direct realists argue that although the appearance of a physical object, such as an ice cream cone, may change with varying distances and angles of viewing, these are merely apparent changes reflective of the real object in that particular position. Reid explains, “The appearance of a visible object is infinitely diversified according to its distance and position. The visible appearances are innumerable when we confine ourselves to one object, and they are multiplied according to the variety of objects.”¹ In support of this account of perception, Reid first points out that direct realism enjoys the general support of those untrained in philosophy, whereas indirect representationalism and phenomenalism do not. He writes, “It is therefore acknowledged to be a natural instinct or prepossession, a universal and primary opinion of all men, a primary instinct of nature, that the objects which we immediately perceive by our senses are not images in our minds, but external objects, and that their existence is independent of us and our perception.”² After devoting the majority of his paper to refuting the claims of the indirect representationalists and the idealists, Reid shifts the burden of proof to those who would deny the truth of direct realism. He believes that since direct realism enjoys such widespread intuitive support, it must be first shown to be false before considering other counterintuitive theories, writing, “I beg leave to dissent from philosophy till she gives me reason for what she teaches. For, though common sense and my external senses demand my assent to their dictates upon their own authority, yet philosophy is not entitled to this privilege.”³ Beyond this burden of proof shift and the note that common sense should be trusted, Reid offers little argumentation in favor of direct realism.

Even if Reid had completely dismantled all reasons for adopting either representationalism or phenomenalism, the skeptic would not be left with any philosophical reason to adopt direct realism. Neither the collectively held intuition nor the burden of proof argument provides any justification for the positive assertion of direct realism. This should be enough to allow the skeptic to resist accepting the account, but even Reid’s arguments against competing theories remain unconvincing and even detrimental to his case. In direct realism, Reid asserts, perception is inert, countering the Malebranche-Clarke-Portfield argument stating that when we perceive objects, they either act upon us, or we act upon them.⁴ Contrary to Reid, Malebranche and his associates acknowledge that there must be some form of causation in perception, because when we perceive, we change from not having a perception of something, to having a certain perception. To say that perception can be inert, inactive, or passive, as Reid suggests, is to say that something can come from nothing, which is more absurd than any alternative to direct realism.

Further adding to the implausibility of the account, science conflicts with direct realism.⁵ Current scientific theory holds that light, for instance, consists of a broad spectrum that includes UV, microwave, and gamma radiation. The visible spectrum that we perceive represents only a small fraction of that which constitutes light as a whole. Our visual sense data, then, might be considered a limited image or representation of the real object, which reflects the entire spectrum. Scientific explanations of other senses such as hearing and smell follow the same pattern. The direct realist must devise either a way to address these discoveries within the theory or else a reason to reject the findings of science. Indirect representationalism, which we will discuss next, can much more effectively adapt to the scientific explanation of perception.

II. Indirect Representationalism

Motivated by the findings of science, we are logically compelled to move to indirect representationalism, which posits that we perceive ideas that resemble actual objects in the external world. Indirect representationalists affirm both that the immediate objection of perception is a sense impression that cannot exist apart from our awareness of it, and that the physical world exists independently of and is the cause of our perceptions.⁶ The classic formulation of this account comes from the writings of John Locke, who cleaved a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities. He writes, “The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas, produced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all.”⁷ Our ideas of primary qualities, which include solidity, extension, figure, and motion, resemble the properties of the external object, whereas our ideas of secondary qualities, such as heat, color, and smell, do not resemble anything in the object. Locke believed that primary qualities are “utterly inseparable from the body” because “in what state soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps.” ⁸ Primary qualities are a constant property that rests in the object itself, while secondary qualities are merely powers to produce sensations within us. It is this distinction between primary and secondary qualities, coupled with his causal account of perception, that allows Locke to claim that we perceive external objects indirectly by forming ideas of them.

Armed with this account of perception, Locke then employs it to argue for our ability to have knowledge of the external world. Sensation, Locke argues, is the only means by which we acquire knowledge of external objects. But the mere existence of an idea in the mind does not verify the existence of an external object. Locke asserts that when an idea is received “from without,” or when it comes to us without our willing, we can be sure that it indicates the existence of the external world.⁹ He continues to argue that “exterior causes affect our senses” by pointing out that those devoid of certain sensory organs do not possess that corresponding sense.¹⁰ Locke also notes that he cannot help but have certain ideas and perceive certain things, like the light of the sun, and still other ideas are painfully embedded in our memories. In addition, Locke affirms his position by calling attention to the fact that the senses often confirm one another, such as in the case of seeing the light of a fire and feeling its heat. To skeptic who asks how we know we are not dreaming, Locke argues that our faculties are designed only to give us just enough certainty to survive and persevere in life, rather then to eliminate all possible doubt. Our faculties assure us that things exist independently of us, and for all practical purposes, Locke believes that this is enough to make us at least live as if the world was not all in our imagination. This final push to answer the skeptic runs oddly similar in tone to Reid’s earlier appeal to common sense.

The skeptic challenges indirect representationalism by pointing out that the proponent cannot pierce the notorious “veil of perception” that appears when ideas mediate our interaction with the external world. Conveniently, George Berkeley offers numerous arguments against indirect representationalism in his defense of idealism. Berkeley attacks the notion of primary and secondary qualities by noting the arbitrariness of the distinction between the two. He writes, “In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colors and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion.”¹¹ Essentially, any argument that proves that secondary qualities only exist in the mind will also prove that supposed primary qualities also exist only in the mind. Yet, it is this very distinction between primary and secondary qualities that differentiates the indirect representationalist from either the direct realist or the idealist. In order to have knowledge of the external world through our ideas, on the indirect representationalist account, those ideas must resemble the actual world in some way. However, Berkeley questions whether ideas can logically be compared to actual objects at all, arguing that ideas can only resemble other ideas.¹² The indirect representationalist relies on the assumption of material substance that provides the physical substratum that produces our ideas. Yet, the inability to distinguish between ideas that resemble the posited external world and ideas that are a function of the subject leads the skeptic to wonder how we know that there is actually an external world at all. Introducing ideas as an intermediary between our experience and the external world inevitably leads us from indirect representationalism to idealism, to which we now turn our attention.

III. Idealism and Phenomenalism

Idealism and its successor, phenomenalism, maintain that physical objects are mental phenomena that are dependent upon being perceived for their existence. In Berkeley’s view, the entities that make up the world are spirits, or things that perceive, and their ideas.¹³ Idealism and phenomenalism differ only in that while idealism requires the existence of God to hold the external world in existence, phenomenalism views the world as a construct of ideas.¹⁴ Both idealism and phenomenalism deny the existence of a material world. Although it may appear that the skeptic has attained victory against knowledge of the external world and should stop here, this is far from the case. While the skeptic argues that we do not have knowledge of the material world, idealism goes a step further, claiming that the material world does not exist. As this represents a knowledge claim, it must come under skeptical scrutiny. Fortunately, arguments in favor of idealism’s denial of the material world tend to collapse into arguments for skepticism.

Berkeley attempts to undermine the doctrine of material substance in order to validate idealism, but his arguments favor skeptical conclusions over idealist ones. First, he asserts that material substance is an incomprehensible notion because no one can have an idea of pure matter without attributing some sort of sensory quality to it. Yet, though the concept of the material world may be difficult to apprehend, this does not constitute a disproof, as there is nothing in the notion of incomprehensibility that leads to non-existence. In a second attack, Berkeley writes, “But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how it is possible for us to know this?”¹⁴ He points out that in order to have knowledge of the external world, we must either acquire it through sense, or by reason. Because reason cannot prove the existence of matter that exists unperceived, and we only perceive ideas through our senses, Berkeley asserts that we cannot know whether material entities exist. Clearly, this is an argument for skepticism, rather than a disproof of material substance. Yet, Berkeley does it again, writing, “In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now”¹⁵ He wishes to point out that even if external bodies existed, our sensory data would not change. Thus, the existence of external bodies would appear to add nothing to our experience of the world. Still, why should we reject their existence based on this observation? Berkeley further argues that the materialist has even more difficulty explaining how ideas are produced in the mind, because they have to account for how corporeal matter can interact with incorporeal mind. Expressing the sum of his arguments against the materialist, he writes, “If you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance…to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it…I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist.”¹⁶ Here, Berkeley contends that the doctrine of material substance is explanatorily superfluous, and that there is no evidence in support of it. Neither of these arguments constitutes a disproof of materialism. Therefore, although Berkeley attempts to disprove the existence of the material world, he ends up with skeptical, rather than immaterial, conclusions.

Dissatisfied with idealism’s attempts to prove its claims, we may be tempted to move to phenomenalism. But it is here that the skeptic should go on the attack. C. H. Whiteley defines phenomenalism as “the doctrine that all statements about material objects can be completely analyzed into statements about sense-data.”¹⁷ Whiteley himself offers three criticisms of phenomenalism which he formulates in paradoxes. The first paradox concerns the conflict between the phenomenalist account of permanence and our ordinary language.¹⁸ When I say, “There is a dinosaur in the closet,” I mean that at this very moment, there exists an ancient reptile that inhabits my wardrobe. However, the phenomenalist account would reinterpret my statement as mistaken, claiming that what I actually mean is that if you were to open my closet, you would acquire the sense-data of seeing a dinosaur. My statement about the present becomes a statement about the possible future, which is counterintuitive. The second paradox concerns the phenomenalist account of causality.¹⁹ Suppose we observe a cardboard box bursting into flames, and posit that this occurred due to the matches inside igniting the gunpowder. All we observe is the burning of the box, and so the sense-data of the matches and gunpowder are possible, rather than actual. This leads to the odd situation where the possible is capable of causing the actual—in other words, where something can come from nothing. The third paradox of phenomenalism, Whiteley writes, is that “there is no good argument for phenomenalism which is not an equally good argument for solipsism.”²⁰ Because all of my statements about other people must, according to phenomenalism, be reinterpreted as statements about my own observations, I cannot coherently talk about the mental states of other people. Now presented with the impalpability of phenomenalism, I contend that we are led back to skepticism.

IV. Fallibilism

From the previous arguments, it is clear that we have no satisfactory account of perception by which we can claim to have knowledge of the external world. We are struck with various kinds of sense impressions, but what indication they give of the external world we do not know. Now, we consider another attempt to escape skepticism: the claim to have fallibiistic knowledge, or knowledge that remains justified despite not being immune from error. It will be useful to contrast the fallibilist’s position with that of G. E. Moore, who in turn can be thought of as responding to the classic “brain in a vat” skeptical argument. The brain-in-a-vat argument, which posits that possibly we are merely brains kept alive in nutritional vats being stimulated with sensory data by deceptive scientists, can be formulated as follows:²¹

(1) If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have two hands.

(2) I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat

(3-C) I do not know that I have two hands.

This argument can then be applied to all manner of knowledge claims, such as “There is a canary flying overhead,” “I have glorious red hair,” and “The phone is ringing.” Although the skeptical conclusion is admittedly counterintuitive, it appears to be valid and sound. If the argument succeeds, then it is clear that our knowledge of the external world is extremely limited. G. E. Moore, however, attempts to upend this argument using common sense. He believes he can offer a “perfectly rigorous proof” of the existence of numerous entities in the external world. In one instance, he claims to prove that he has two hands “by holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand,’ and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’.”²² His argument can be written as follows:

(1) If I do not know that I am a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have two hands.

(2) I know that I have two hands.

(3-C) I know that I am not a brain in a vat.

Moore believes this proof is both valid and sound because it passes his three conditions for being a solid argument: the premises are different from the conclusion, the premises are known to be true, and the conclusion follows from the premises. The skeptic, however, should allege that Moore’s argument is question-begging against the brain in a vat argument. ²³ Accepting Moore’s conclusion requires that we ignore the second premise of the brain in a vat argument, that “We do not know that we are not a brain in a vat.” As long as we do not know that we are not a brain in a vat, we cannot know that we have two hands. Thus, we cannot deny that we are in a brain in a vat based on knowledge of our hands, because knowledge of our hands depends on knowing that we are not a brain in a vat. Moore’s argument fails to refute the skeptic because its premises are question-begging.

Once we have been convinced of Moore’s failure, the fallibilist can step in and attempt to accomplish what Moore could not. The fallibilist has a way to respond to the brain in a vat argument that takes advantage of her lenient definition of knowledge. For instance, the fallibilist can know that there is not a teapot floating around the Moon, that leprechauns do not exist, and that the Flying Spaghetti Monster does not exist because she has ample evidence to support her view even if the evidence does not grant her absolute certainty that these propositions are true. Thus, the fallibilist can claim that she knows the technology and manpower required to set up and operate a brain in a vat laboratory do not exist. Her argument against the brain in a vat scenario then runs as follows:²⁴

(1) If I know that the technology and manpower necessary to maintain a brain in a vat do not exist, then I know that I am not a brain in a vat.

(2) I know that the technology and manpower necessary to maintain a brain in a vat do not exist.

(3-C) I know that I am not a brain in a vat.

Does the fallibilist succeed in undermining the skeptical position regarding knowledge of the external world? In this case, the argument against the skeptic is not as clearly question-begging. Since we have reached a point where we have found two apparently valid and sound arguments that lead to contradictory conclusions, we must therefore consider the evidence for the premises of each.²⁵ For example, I recognize that, if I was a brain in a vat, I would have exactly the same experiences that I am having now. This provides evidence in support of the skeptical premise, “I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.” On the other hand, I have good reason to believe, based on current research methods in neuroscience, that currently, brain tissue can only be kept alive in vitro for six to twelve hours. This supports the fallibilist premise, “I know that the technology and manpower necessary to maintain a brain in a vat do not exist.” The battle between these two arguments will resolve depending on what evidence the subject has for each premise, coupled with the subject’s own intuitions regarding the matter. Yet the skeptic has endeavored to show, throughout the course of this paper, that our attempts to formulate accounts of perception, the means by which we access the external world, are remarkably flawed. This should count as evidence for the skeptical premise, and even if it does not, it at the very least shows that the fallibilist has more obstacles to overcome before she can rightly claim knowledge. In the absence of a coherent account of perception, what kind of certainty about the external world can the fallibilist claim? Without the answer, we are again drawn to skepticism.

V. Beyond Skepticism

What are the practical implications of our skeptical conclusions? The most immediate consequence appears to be a stark divorce between the philosophical and the practical. Admittedly, the skeptical conclusion must strike many subjects as quite counterintuitive. We cannot help but believe in an external world, some have suggested. It appears, then, that we have arrived at a position similar to David Hume, who writes, “This skeptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur’d, but must return upon us every moment.”²⁶ Hume arrives at similar conclusions to us after deducing that neither our senses nor our reason can be utilized justify our knowledge of the external world.²⁷ We find the belief in an external world so compelling due to the coherence and constancy of our impressions. In the end, he advises, “Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be the reader’s opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world.”²⁸ Though we may endorse skepticism philosophically, we are struck with the conviction of knowledge in the practical realm. How can we reconcile this gap? For this, I turn to W. V. Quine, who writes, “In point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods [of Homer] differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.”²⁹ For Quine, the physical world as a useful posit, to be evaluated by how well it helps us function in the world. We need not even be certain of its existence, but rather aware of the effects of its belief on our effectiveness. Indeed, perhaps the challenge for the aspiring skeptic lies not in rejecting certainty, but rather in learning to cope with uncertainty.

Conclusion

We begin with common sense, which leads us to direct realism, which turns to indirect representationalism, which collapses into idealism, which begets phenomenalism, which ultimately brings us to skepticism. I have argued that because there is no satisfactory account of perception, the proper response to questions of whether we have knowledge of the external world is that we do not. Direct realism, though perhaps the most intuitive account, conflicts with the findings of science. Indirect representationalism leads to idealism because it runs into difficulty establishing the difference between the properties of our ideas that resemble actual objects and the properties that do not. The majority of arguments for idealism are in fact arguments for skepticism, while numerous paradoxes confound phenomenalism. Skepticism, I have shown, is able to resist the Moorean and fallibilist attacks, but the conflict between the fallibilist’s and the skeptic’s position ultimately results in a stand-off.

NOTES

I am grateful to Professor Vaida for comfort in times of distress.

¹ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.113

² The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.109

³ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.112

⁴ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.111

⁵ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.72

⁶ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.72

⁷ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.79

⁸ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.78

⁹ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.86

¹⁰ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.86

¹¹ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.91

¹² The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.90

¹³ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.89

¹⁴ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.73

¹⁵ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.92

¹⁶ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.93

¹⁷ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.101

¹⁸ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.106

¹⁹ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.107

²⁰ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.107

²¹ Knowledge and Skepticism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Matthias Steup

²² The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.53

²³ Knowledge and Skepticism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Matthias Steup

²⁴ Knowledge and Skepticism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Matthias Steup

²⁵ Knowledge and Skepticism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Matthias Steup

²⁶ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.48

²⁷ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.48

²⁸ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.48

²⁹ The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis Pojman, p.402

The Meaning of Life

I have always been a bit startled because philosophers tend not to address this subject, even though it is often reflection upon this topic that draws people into philosophy to begin with.

It is also a notable subject because it is one of the few philosophical topics for which the Wikipedia entry is arguably more robust than the SEP entry. See for yourself:

Wikipedia entry on "The Meaning of Life"

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the Meaning of Life

A thought question, prompted by Prof. Vaida:
Since we do not know the Meaning of Life, does this mean that all of our actions are irrational?

Anselm's Ontological Argument

(This came up in discussion, and I thought it would be good to have a copy on-hand. The translation is from St. Anselm College - http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/anselm.htm - if you can trust anyone to get it right, probably them is the way to go).

From the Proslogium

Therefore, Lord, who grant understanding to faith, grant me that, in so far as you know it beneficial, I understand that you are as we believe and you are that which we believe. Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be imagined.

Then is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart: God is not? But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying - something than which nothing greater can be imagined - understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it is. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding and another to understand that a thing is.

For when a painter imagines beforehand what he is going to make, he has in his undertanding what he has not yet made but he does not yet understand that it is. But when he has already painted it, he both has in his understanding what he has already painted and understands that it is.
Therefore even the fool is bound to agree that there is at least in the understanding something than which nothing greater can be imagined, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding.

And certainly that than which a greater cannot be imagined cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is at least in the understanding alone, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater. Therefore if that than which a greater cannot be imagined is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be imagined is something than which a greater can be imagined. But certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be imagined, both in the understanding and in reality.

[A basic analysis from Princeton can be found here.]

Topics List

This is the topics list of subjects we'd like to discuss over the course of the year. Feel free to update it as you come up with topics about which you are curious or passionate. I will also include the dates that we cover the particular topics, as well as our discussion leaders.

Existence of God
Number Theory (4.21.08 - Jacob)
Philosophy of Mathematics
Moral Intuitionism
Utilitarianism
Ultimate Justification in Ethics

How to Email Directly to the Blog

There is a useful feature whereby we can send emails simultaneously to the list and the blog. This can be particularly convenient if, say, you just discovered an article or video that you'd like to share with the group, but would also like to post on the blog for further discussion.

First, from your dashboard, click on "Settings."
Then, click on "Email" from the links at the top.
Next, enter something for your "Mail-to-Blogger Address." For me, I use shadowzero359.sophia[at]blogger.com .

After that, any time you want to both inform the group about a great article AND post it on the blog for future reference, send your email to the members of the group and your mail-to-blogger address.

Yay technology!

A Welcome Message

Dear Aspiring Philosopher,

If you've ever wanted a supportive and encouraging group with which to share your recent philosophical insights or simply a friendly group with whom to explore your philosophical interests, this is the entity that we aim to create with the "Order of Sophia" (title may change).

"Sophia" is the Greek word for "wisdom," and it is, in my mind, the pursuit of this ideal that unites our membership.

Prof. Ekstrom inspired me to start our discussion group as a remedy to the current problem of relative philosophical isolation-- professional philosophers today do their work huddled in their caves, emerging after weeks or months of working on a paper only to have it eviscerated by complete strangers who care not about their careful work. We thought it would be beneficial to have a group where people with a shared interest in philosophy could gather and help each other progress in their philosophical development.

To that end, we've created this blog, wherein we can keep in touch over the summer, discuss elaborate issues (like the existence of God), and share interesting articles and papers that we've written.

I hope we will make good use of this and other tools as we continue on our respective philosophical journeys.


Sincerely,
-Long